Category: SANS Internet Storm Center

Point of Sale Terminal Protection – "Fortress PCI at the Mall", (Tue, Aug 26th) 0

Point of Sale Terminal Protection – "Fortress PCI at the Mall", (Tue, Aug 26th)

This is a very broad topic, but over the last few months I’ve seen some really nicly protected PCI termainls.  Especially since many POS environments are still running Windows XP, this is an important topic to discuss. Things that I’ve seen done very well: First of all, only allow access to the POS app – retail staff generally don’t require access to email or the internet, at least not from the sales terminal.  Most POS systems I’ve seen are running kiosk setups, which removes explorer, the start button and kills all hotkeys.  I’m often able to break out of windows kiosk applications from the keyboard by using a hotkey combination that’s been missed.  For instance, Windows+U calls utilman.exe in XP, if you replace utilman with cmd.exe you are in.  Be sure to account for hot-keys! If you lock down the POS terminals such that a CMD prompt / start menu and so on are not accessible, then the classic “usb rubber ducky” or “teensy” keyboard as a usb key type attack – where you drop a usb key into and exposed port while making a purchase – is that much tougher.  If you can’t get a cmd prompt or some field to enter commands, a malicious keyboard attack of this type isn’t likely to succeed. On that same note, use GPO or your endpoint protection product to lock down USB access.  Even if (or maybe especially if) a repair tech needs USB access, inserting a USB device should need a call to head office

UDP port 1900 DDoS traffic, (Mon, Aug 25th) 0

UDP port 1900 DDoS traffic, (Mon, Aug 25th)

I guess this is my day for asking for feedback from our readers.  Again, I’m going to ask “Got packets?”  On 22 Aug, one of our readers (Paul) commented on the Port 1900 page that he was seeing a DDoS on port 1900, with packet sizes of 300 bytes.  This is a development we’ve been watching at $dayjob, too, but I was wondering if anyone (including Paul) has packets so we can try to figure out what the amplification mechanism might actually be (if you have the packets, please share via the contact page ).  What we’re seeing in Dshield data is a little odd and different from what I’m seeing at $dayjob.  You’ll note below that there were a more targets until they suddenly dropped off on 18 Jun.  On the other hand, the sources seem to be trending upward (at least, peaking higher).  Unfortunately, we only have source and target counts in the Dshield data, not byte volumes.  Compare that with what we’re seeing at the $dayjob as shown in the webcast we do weekly there (from 39:55 in this video — watch to about 47:00 if you want to see our discussion of all the reflective DoS ports we’re watching). References: [1] https://isc.sans.edu/port.html?port=1900 [2] http://techchannel.att.com/play-video.cfm/2014/8/14/AT&T-ThreatTraq-1-Billion-Accounts-Hacked ————— Jim Clausing, GIAC GSE #26 jclausing –at– isc [dot] sans (dot) edu (c) SANS Internet Storm Center.