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Friday Squid Blogging: Striped Pyjama Squid Pet Sculpture

Technically, it’s a cuttlefish and not a squid. But it’s still nice art. I posted a photo of a real striped pyjama squid way back in 2006.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

The original article/video can be found at Friday Squid Blogging: Striped Pyjama Squid Pet Sculpture

Applied Cryptography on Elementary

In the episode that aired on May 9th, about eight or nine minutes in, there’s a scene with a copy of Applied Cryptography prominently displayed on the coffee table. This isn’t the first time that my books have appeared on that TV show.

Applied Crypto on Elementary.jpg

The original article/video can be found at Applied Cryptography on Elementary

SSL: Another reason not to ignore IPv6, (Fri, May 17th)

Currently, many public web sites that allow access via IPv6 do so via proxies. This is seen as the “quick fix”, as it requires minimum changes to the site itself. As far as the web application is concerned, all incoming traffic is IPv4. 

The most obvious issue here is logging, in that the application only “sees” the proxies IP address, unless it inspects headers added by the proxy, which will no point to (unreadable?) IPv6 addresses.

But there is another issue: SSL Certificates. If only IPv6 connections are passed via the proxy, you will end up with two different certificate: One for the proxy, and one for the web application (or the IPv4 proxy). It may also happen that the IPv6 and IPv4 site are considered two different hosts on the web server, requiring distinct configurations.

For example, at this point, “www.socialsecurity.gov” uses two different certificates. One for IPv6 and one for IPv4. The IPv6 certifiate is expired, while the IPv4 certificate is valid. This is in particularly painful as some simple comand line tools, like “openssl s_client' are still not able to work over IPv6. For my test, I used gnutls-cli, which works similar to openssl s_client but supports IPv6.

Excerpt from the result:

 

gnutls-cli -p 443 --x509cafile /opt/local/share/ncat/ca-bundle.crt www.socialsecurity.gov
Processed 291 CA certificate(s).
Resolving 'www.socialsecurity.gov'...
Connecting to '2001:1930:c01::aaaa:443'...
[...]
- subject `C=US,ST=maryland,L=baltimore,O=social security administration,OU=diias,OU=Terms of use at www.verisign.com/rpa (c)05,CN=www.socialsecurity.gov', issuer `C=US,O=VeriSign, Inc.,OU=VeriSign Trust Network,OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10,CN=VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G3', RSA key 1024 bits, signed using RSA-SHA1, activated `2012-04-05 00:00:00 UTC', expires `2013-04-29 23:59:59 UTC', SHA-1 fingerprint `3286afd908f256947b396dbae88d37b111c9aaaf'
[...]
- Status: The certificate is NOT trusted. The certificate chain uses expired certificate. 
*** Verifying server certificate failed...
*** Fatal error: Error in the certificate.
*** Handshake has failed
GnuTLS error: Error in the certificate.
	 

Next, lets try IPv4. A disadvantage of gnutls-cli is that you are not able to force an IPv4 connection, so I will just fall back to openssl here:

$ openssl s_client -connect www.socialsecurity.gov:443 -CAfile /opt/local/share/ncat/ca-bundle.crt
[....]
subject=/C=US/ST=maryland/L=baltimore/O=social security administration/OU=diias/OU=Terms of use at www.verisign.com/rpa (c)05/CN=www.socialsecurity.gov
issuer=/C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=VeriSign Trust Network/OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10/CN=VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G3
[...]
 
And after saving the certificate to a file:
 
$ openssl x509 -in /tmp/ssa.gov -text
[...]
Validity
        Not Before: Apr 22 00:00:00 2013 GMT
        Not After : Apr 30 23:59:59 2017 GMT
        Subject: C=US, ST=maryland, L=baltimore, O=social security administration, OU=diias, OU=Terms of use at www.verisign.com/rpa (c)05, CN=www.socialsecurity.gov
So in short: two different certificates for the same host name. This isn't always bad, and not uncommon. But all certificates have to be valid!

—— Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. SANS Technology Institute Twitter

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. http://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

The original article/video can be found at SSL: Another reason not to ignore IPv6, (Fri, May 17th)

VU#774103: Linux kernel perf_swevent_enabled array out-of-bound access privilege escalation vulnerability

Vulnerability Note VU#774103

Linux kernel perf_swevent_enabled array out-of-bound access privilege escalation vulnerability

Original Release date: 17 May 2013 | Last revised: 17 May 2013

Overview

The Linux kernel’s Performance Events implementation is susceptible to an out-of-bounds array vulnerability that may be used by a local unprivileged user to escalate privileges.

Description

The Linux kernel’s Performance Events implementation is susceptible to an out-of-bounds array vulnerability that may be used by a local unprivileged user to escalate privileges. Additional analysis of the vulnerability may be found in the Red Hat bug report. A public exploit is available that has been reported to work against some Linux distributions.

Impact

A local authenticated user may be able to exploit this vulnerability to escalate privileges.

Solution

Apply an Update

Red Hat, Debian, CentOS, and Ubuntu have all released patches. Users should receive the patches through their Linux distributions’ normal update process.

Affected Distributions

  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 & Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2
  • CentOS 6
  • Debian 7.0 (Wheezy)
  • Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, 12.10, 13.04

Other distributions may be affected but were not confirmed at the time of publication.

If you are unable to upgrade, please consider the following workaround.

Red Hat has provided mitigation advice in Red Hat Knowledge Solution 373743.

Vendor Information (Learn More)

Vendor Status Date Notified Date Updated
CentOS Affected - 17 May 2013
Debian GNU/Linux Affected - 17 May 2013
Red Hat, Inc. Affected - 17 May 2013
Ubuntu Affected - 17 May 2013
Fedora Project Unknown - 17 May 2013
Slackware Linux Inc. Unknown - 17 May 2013
SUSE Linux Unknown - 17 May 2013

If you are a vendor and your product is affected, let
us know
.

CVSS Metrics (Learn More)

Group Score Vector
Base 6.8 AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
Temporal 5.9 E:ND/RL:OF/RC:C
Environmental 4.4 CDP:ND/TD:M/CR:ND/IR:ND/AR:ND

References

Credit

Tommi Rantala discovered this vulnerability.

This document was written by Jared Allar.

Other Information

  • CVE IDs:
    CVE-2013-2094
  • Date Public:
    14 May 2013
  • Date First Published:
    17 May 2013
  • Date Last Updated:
    17 May 2013
  • Document Revision:
    26

Feedback

If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.

The original article/video can be found at VU#774103: Linux kernel perf_swevent_enabled array out-of-bound access privilege escalation vulnerability

Bank Account Logins for Sale, Courtesy of Citadel Botnet

Financial theft is one of the most lucrative forms of cybercrime. Malware authors continue to deliver sophisticated tools and techniques to unlock online bank accounts. Attackers design and develop botnets to perform financial fraud, targeting banks and other institutions for profit. These botnets traditionally have monitored victims’ Internet activities and intercepted banking transactions to extract account credentials and send them to their control servers. Recent botnets are armed with more advanced capabilities, yet traditional methods continue to be the most effective way to steal money.

Recently I came across an underground Russian forum in which an author was actively selling botnet logs with account-login details from one targeted bank.

cit1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

These botnet logs were from the Citadel botnet Version 1.3.4.5 (Extreme Edition). Citadel is a variant of the popular Zeus botnet and has been widely seen since late 2012. This botnet has already been covered in blogs and by McAfee Labs.

Here is an image of server code for extracting bank account information.

cit7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Next we see what Citadel can do. I tried log in to several bank accounts using the posted credentials and was surprised to find that most of the accounts mentioned were active. I could log in to them successfully.

 

cit2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cit3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cit4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Our research has revealed that Citadel  is one of the most active botnets in the world, spanning several locations across Europe. One of the major reasons for its common use is that the botnet setup services are fairly cheap via the underground community. Here is an advertisement for the Citadel setup service.

 

cit5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The same user offers the setup services on another forum:

 

cit6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cit8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Many cybercriminals avoid transferring money to their own accounts due to the risk of prosecution, but selling the account information and making the money from the sale is an effective way of preserving  anonymity. Thus the attacker can’t be held accountable for the transfers made from a stolen account.

As the precautionary measure, we should look out for accounts being accessed or transactions made to/from different geographical locations. Banks place limits on the amount of money that can be transferred in one day or in a single transaction. Spotting small, unauthorized transactions made from an account should be noticeable and prevent major financial losses.

 

The original article/video can be found at Bank Account Logins for Sale, Courtesy of Citadel Botnet

ISC StormCast for Friday, May 17th 2013 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=3314, (Fri, May 17th)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. http://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

The original article/video can be found at ISC StormCast for Friday, May 17th 2013 http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=3314, (Fri, May 17th)

e-netprotections.su ?, (Fri, May 17th)

 

Like with .biz, I sometimes have the impression that .su and .cc could be sinkholed in their entirety, because the bad domains seem to vastly outnumber whatever (if any) good is running under these TLDs as well.

Earlier today, ISC reader Michael contacted us with information that several PCs on his network had started to communicate with iestats.cc, emstats.su, ehistats.su, e-protections.su and a couple other domains. I was pretty sure that I had seen the latter domain on an earlier occasion in a malware outbreak, but I couldn't find it in our records .. until I only searched for “e-protections”, and found e-protections.cc. This domain had been implicated back in October 2012 in a malware spree that was linked to the nasty W32.Caphaw, a backdoor/information stealer. The similarity of the names was too much of a coincidence, and it meant bad news for Michael.

Looking at what was captured by some of our network sensors allowed to reconstruct a (partial) picture of the IPs and ASN's involved in today's malware wave

Domain IP AS Provider Country
ppetoc.iestats.cc 64.85.161.67 30517 Great Lakes Comnet USA
ppetoc.iestats.cc 85.25.132.55 8972 PlusServer Intergenia AG Germany
ppetoc.iestats.cc 173.224.210.244 40676 Psychz Networks USA
ppetoc.iestats.cc 178.63.172.88 24940 Hetzner Online AG Germany
ppetoc.iestats.cc 188.95.48.152 57172 Global Layer B.V. Netherlands

The host name portion for some of the domains looks like it is time dependent (incrementing ascii) whereas other domains use (apparently) random names like d3acofzi7hjft.e-protections.su. Name servers involved today include ns1.abercrombienfr.net (currently 199.68.199.178 – AS1426) and ns1.semi-spa.net (currently 91.227.220.104 – AS50300). I doubt the former has anything to do with the clothing store, the domain was created four months ago.

Closer inspection of Michael's PCs revealed that each infected box was apparently running a slightly different version of the EXE. Anti-Virus coverage is still thin (Virustotal) , but the Heuristics of some products seem to be catching on. This sample looks more like a ransomware trojan than Caphaw, but we'll know more once we analyze all the information gathered so far.

If you have information to add on this particular malware or the domains mentioned, please comment below, or use our contact form.

 

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. http://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

The original article/video can be found at e-netprotections.su ?, (Fri, May 17th)

Extracting signatures from Apple .apps, (Thu, May 16th)


As an add-on to ISC Handler Lenny Zeltser's earlier diary on extracting certificates from signed Windows binaries, here's how to do the same on a Mac. Given that today's blog over at F-Secure documents a screenshot-taking Mac spyware that is signed with a developer ID, signed bad .apps might actually be more prevalent than expected.

To verify and extract signatures and certificates on an Apple .app, you can do (example Mail.app)

codesign -dvvvv –extract-certificates  /Applications/Mail.app

This will save the certificates in DER format, named codesign0, codesign1, etc. These can then be displayed as usual with OpenSSL

openssl x509 -inform DER -in codesign0 -text

 

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. http://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

The original article/video can be found at Extracting signatures from Apple .apps, (Thu, May 16th)

Bluetooth-Controlled Door Lock

Here is a new lock that you can control via Bluetooth and an iPhone app.

That’s pretty cool, and I can imagine all sorts of reasons to get one of those. But I’m sure there are all sorts of unforeseen security vulnerabilities in this system. And, even worse, a single vulnerability can affect all the locks. Remember that vulnerability found last year in hotel electronic locks?

Anyone care to guess how long before some researcher finds a way to hack this one? And how well the maker anticipated the need to update the firmware to fix the vulnerability once someone finds it?

I’m not saying that you shouldn’t use this lock, only that you understand that new technology brings new security risks, and electronic technology brings new kinds of security risks. Security is a trade-off, and the trade-off is particularly stark in this case.

The original article/video can be found at Bluetooth-Controlled Door Lock

Security Updates Available for Adobe Reader and Acrobat

Original release date: May 16, 2013

Adobe has released security updates for Adobe Reader and Acrobat to address multiple vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could cause a crash and potentially allow an attacker to take control of an affected system.

The following versions of Adobe Reader and Acrobat are affected:

  • Adobe Reader XI (11.0.02) and earlier 11.x versions for Windows and Macintosh
  • Adobe Reader X (10.1.6) and earlier 10.x versions for Windows and Macintosh
  • Adobe Reader 9.5.4 and earlier 9.x versions for Windows and Macintosh
  • Adobe Reader 9.5.4 and earlier 9.x versions for Linux
  • Adobe Acrobat XI (11.0.02) and earlier 11.x versions for Windows and Macintosh
  • Adobe Acrobat X (10.1.6) and earlier 10.x versions for Windows and Macintosh
  • Adobe Acrobat 9.5.4 and earlier 9.x versions for Windows and Macintosh

US-CERT encourages users and administrators to review Adobe Security Bulletin APSB13-15 and follow best-practice security policies to determine which updates should be applied.


This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

The original article/video can be found at Security Updates Available for Adobe Reader and Acrobat